Prescription Laws: Federal and State by Waleski, Jake
Seton Hall University 
eRepository @ Seton Hall 
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law 
2020 
Prescription Laws: Federal and State 
Jake Waleski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
1 
 
In 2017, 47,000 Americans died of opioid overdose that includes: opioid prescriptions, 
heroin, and illicit fentanyl.1 That same year, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) declared a public health emergency associated with opioid drug abuse.2 HHS published 
the graph below to highlight the statistics associated with the “Opioid Crisis.” 
 
       Hereby labeled “Chart 1” 
  
 
 The “Opioid Crisis” has brought back the importance of prescription drug abuse 
enforcement and regulation. The public outcry against the epidemic caused states to create their 
own regulations and laws handling prescription drug abuse and opioids. After states enact 
 
1 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Opioid Overdose Crisis NIDA (2019), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (last visited Mar 20, 
2019). 
2 Public Affairs, What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic? HHS.gov, 
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (last visited Mar 20, 2019). 
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regulations and laws governing the practice of medicine, agencies known as State Medical 
Boards (SMB) interpret and enforce their state’s medical laws.3 Furthermore, the state laws 
specify the responsibilities of the SMB.4 The main mechanism through which SMB’s enforce 
and govern physicians is licensing.5   
 Physicians are subjected to multitudes of standards and regulations. For instance, 
physicians must comply with SMBs, The Controlled Substance Act (CSA), and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) registrations. This paper examines how the various levels of 
regulation impact physicians while examining whether a circuit split exists in the standard 
applied to analyzing physician prescribing of opioids. The following sections break down both 
state and federal regulations. This paper will start on the state level and compare states with 
“stricter” laws to states with “looser” laws as to impact on physicians and patients. Regarding 
federal laws, this paper will investigate whether there is a split in standards between the Circuit 
courts.  
 
State Laws/Regulations and the State Medical Boards: 
 States can create their own laws regarding the management of physicians within their 
own borders. For the most part, these state laws and regulations are enforced and carried out by 
SMBs.6 SMBs are the state created agency that enforce and carry out the state laws and 
 
3 The Role of State Medical Boards, 7 Virtual Mentor (2005), https://journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/article/role-state-medical-boards/2005-04. 
4 Id at 5 
5 Id at 7 
6 Kelly K. Dineen & James M. Dubois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 42 American Journal 
of Law & Medicine 7–52 (2016). 
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regulations that pertain to physicians and other healthcare providers.7 SMBs are compiled of 
various individuals, including some professionals and some ordinary citizens, but can vary based 
on the state.8 However, SMBs do not operate like police departments, rather, SMBs react to 
complaints from individuals, organizations, or the state.9 The purpose of SMBs are to protect the 
public and ensure that physicians are acting in accordance with proper treatment.10 Therefore, 
SMBs has broader range to act compared to Federal agencies.11 For instance, SMBs can 
investigate and reprimand physicians if a complaint suggests that the physician is acting 
carelessly/recklessly or if the physician’s ability is compromised.12 A careless/reckless physician 
is a physician that constantly deviates from the professional standard of care.13 These physicians 
are considered “bad doctors,” because of their constant deviations, however, they do not rise to 
the category of corrupt, because they are not abandoning the standard of care for personal or 
financial gain.14 These physicians are disciplined by SMBs but not by federal agencies. 
 Physicians that are compromised are ones that overprescribe or mis-prescribe, because of 
some factor that impairs their judgement.15 Factors include but are not limited to: age, mental 
illness, mental abilities, other illnesses, and being gullible.16 These physicians are disciplined by 
SMBs but not federal agencies as well. Practically, disciplining these physicians through SMBs 
and not through federal agencies makes sense, because they are not criminals, but do present a 
possible danger to the public. It does not appear to be unsettling or disconcerting to discipline 
 
7 Id 
8 Id 
9 James N. Thompson & Lisa A. Robin, State Medical Boards, 33 Journal of Legal Medicine 93–
114 (2012). 
10 Id at 41 
11 The Role of State Medical Boards 
12 Dineen at 33 
13 Id 
14 Id 
15 Id at 34 
16 Id at 20 
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careless or compromised physicians through SMB sanctions, but it would be unsettling and 
disconcerting to subject those physicians to criminal convictions.  
 Prior to 2012, disciplinary hearings against physicians were low.17 Since then, the 
number of physicians being disciplined has increased and continues to increase today.18 SMBs 
investigations are triggered by the filing of a complaint.19 In response to the complaints SMBs 
receive, the state agency can reprimand the physician, for instance, suspension, or the state 
agency can completely revoke the physicians license, thereby preventing the physician from 
practicing within their borders.20 SMBs reprimand physicians after investigating a complaint the 
state agency receives.21 All states allow for voluntary complaints, meaning complaints that are 
usually filed by individuals or corporations.22 In addition to voluntary complaints, SMBs 
investigations are triggered by mandatory reporting.23 Mandatory reporting to SMBs includes 
criminal investigations and charges, criminal prosecutions, convictions of felony, and 
convictions involving controlled substance (i.e. conviction under CSA).24 Additionally, in many 
states, complaints involving over-prescribing are mandatory reporting.25   
 Since 2017, at least seventeen states have enacted rules to limit the number of painkillers 
physicians can prescribe to the patient before the patient has to return to the physician to acquire 
more.26 Most of these opioid prescription drug laws have stemmed from the opioid epidemic that 
 
17 Aaron Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United States, 2014, 101 
Journal of Medical Regulation 7–22 (2015). 
18 Id at 12 
19 Dineen at 25 
20 Id at 99 
21 Id at 101 
22 Id at 28 
23 Id at 31 
24 Id at 35 
25 Id at 40 
26 Katie Zezima, With drug overdoses soaring, states limit the length of painkiller 
prescriptionsThe Washington Post(2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-drug-
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has developed within the United States. Some states, including New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and Delaware have limited the initial opioid prescription amount to five or seven 
days.27 
 For example, New Jersey was the first state to limit the initial opioid prescription amount 
to five days.28 In addition, New Jersey is considered to be an example of a state with strict rules 
on opioid prescribing.29 NJ allows for physicians to renew the prescription on the fourth day if 
the patient’s pain has not subsided.30 The goal of this NJ law is to limit the number of pills in the 
public.31 This law does not apply to long-term care facilities, chronic pain, hospice or cancer 
patients.32 Then Governor Chris Christie stated, "Today, we are taking action to save lives," in 
reference to this state law passing.33 
 States that have limited the amount of initial days to opioid prescriptions appear to be 
following the guidance of a 2016 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study 
finding that patients that use painkillers for longer than seven days increase their chance of 
opioid addiction. 34 However, this study does not shed light on what timeframe is necessary to 
remedy a patient’s pain. It is unclear as to how many days are appropriate for opioid 
 
overdoses-soaring-states-limit-the-length-of-painkiller-prescriptions/2017/08/09/4d5d7e0c-7d0f-
11e7-83c7-5bd5460f0d7e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5270e90f881d. 
 
27 Id 
28 Susan K., Christie signs bill limiting painkiller prescriptions to five days nj.com (2017), 
https://www.nj.com/politics/2017/02/bill_limitig_painkiller_prescription_on_christies.html (last 
visited Mar 24, 2019). 
29 Id 
30 Id 
31 Id 
32 Id 
33 Id 
34 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6610a1.htm (last visited Mar 
24, 2019). 
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prescriptions, but one study published by JAMA in 2018 found that four to nine days following 
general surgery is typical.35 Additionally, the researchers found that procedures such as hip and 
knee replacement average between six and fifteen days, while women’s health procedures 
generally require anywhere between four and thirteen days. 36 
 While most states set mandatory limits on initial days, few states have yet to set any. For 
instance, Oregon, Iowa and Maryland do not have initial day limitations for prescription drugs.37 
However, Oregon and Maryland do set limitations for minors.38 Oregon, instead of initial day 
limitations, requires physicians to use their judgment to prescribe the lowest dose that will still 
be effective for the patient.39 Physicians are encouraged to prescribe opioids for acute pain only 
if it is necessary.40 Like Oregon, Maryland passed a law that does not set initial day limitations 
but requires physicians/prescribers to prescribe the lowest effective dose of opioid prescription.41  
On the other hand, Iowa requires physicians to register for monitoring programs, and to 
proactively “investigate” whether a patient is a high-risk for opioid abuse and addiction.42 Iowa 
defers to the judgment of the physician/prescriber as to whether a patient requires opioid 
 
35 Rebecca E. Scully et al., Defining Optimal Length of Opioid Pain Medication Prescription 
After Common Surgical Procedures, 153 JAMA Surgery37 (2018). 
 
36 Id at 37 
37 Opioid prescription limits and policies by state, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Opioid_prescription_limits_and_policies_by_state#Oregon (last visited 
Mar 26, 2019). 
38 Id 
39 Opioids: Resources for Health Care Professionals and CCOs, Oregon Health Authority : 
Opioids: Resources for Health Care Professionals and CCOs : Opioid Overdose and Misuse : 
State of Oregon, 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PREVENTIONWELLNESS/SUBSTANCEUSE/OPIOIDS/Pag
es/providers.aspx#resources (last visited Mar 26, 2019). 
40 Id 
41 Governor Larry Hogan - Official Website for the Governor of Maryland, The Office of 
Governor Larry Hogan, https://governor.maryland.gov/2017/05/25/governor-larry-hogan-signs-
legislation-to-combat-heroin-and-opioid-crisis/ (last visited Mar 26, 2019). 
42 Governor.iowa.gov, https://governor.iowa.gov/2018/05/gov-reynolds-signs-bipartisan-opioid-
bill-into-law (last visited Mar 26, 2019). 
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prescription and how much they need. Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds stated, “And like I said in 
my Condition of the State address, this will not end until we take action. With this legislation, we 
are taking the first step to reverse this heart-wrenching trend.”43 Additionally, Maryland 
Governor Larry Hogan states: 
These critical initiatives will help us continue to lead the charge against Maryland’s 
heroin and opioid crisis in our state. Our administration remains committed to 
treating this crisis like the emergency that it is, and I thank the legislature for 
working with us to provide additional tools to save the lives of Marylanders – 
before it’s too late.44 
It is unclear why Oregon, Iowa and Maryland decided not to set any initial day limitations on 
opioid prescriptions. Potentially, it could be that they are giving physicians more discretion to 
combat the opioid epidemic.  
  It is likely that States inform their decisions through studies and articles written by 
researchers and medical professionals. The main distinction between proponents and opponents 
of initial day limitations involves the likelihood of addictions verses ability to manage pain.45 
Proponents agree with the CDC that a limited supply of opioid prescriptions is sufficient to 
manage pain; additionally, prescribing more opioid prescriptions increases the likelihood of 
addiction.46 On the other hand, opponents rely on the claims that limiting opioid prescriptions 
both harm patients and will increase heroin use.47 Essentially, opponents of limiting opioid 
prescriptions believe that it will destabilize patients that rely on opioid prescriptions, mainly 
chronic but also acute, leading them to turn to alternatives, such as heroin.48 For instance, one 
article states: 
 
43 Iowa 
44 Governor Larry 
45 Ballotpedia 
46 Id 
47 Ballotpedia 
48 Id 
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While doing so [discontinuing opioids] could help some, it will destabilize others 
and likely promote the use of heroin or other drugs. ... We cannot be surprised by a 
flurry of reports, in the press, social media, and the medical literature describing 
pain patients entering acute withdrawal, losing function, committing suicide, or 
dying in jail.49 
 
The data supporting these findings are unclear, but rather speculative via anecdotes from 
professional and other experts within the practice. The accuracy of these claims will be revealed 
within the next few years after the opioid prescription initial day limitations have integrated 
within the United States.  
 Regardless of which route a state takes in tackling prescription opioid abuse and 
addiction, it is the job of the SMBs to investigate complaints and enforce the state laws passed 
that regulate medical professionals. Medical professionals are required to understand and comply 
with the laws and regulations within the state that they practice in while understanding and 
complying with The CSA. The following section dives into the caselaw regarding The CSA. 
Afterwards, a discussion about how The CSA caselaw and various state regulations applies to 
hypotheticals.  
 
The CSA and Subsequent Caselaw: 
 This section will discuss the various judicial interpretations of The CSA and examine 
how these various interpretations effect physicians within the circuit/area. Based on reading the 
cases within several jurisdictions/circuits, it appears that there is a split in the standard used to 
convict a physician under The CSA. The focus on these cases look at the meaning of outside the 
 
49 Stefan G. Kertesz & Adam J. Gordon, Strict limits on opioid prescribing risk 'inhumane 
treatment' of pain patients STAT (2018), https://www.statnews.com/2017/02/24/opioids-
prescribing-limits-pain-patients/ (last visited Mar 26, 2019). 
9 
 
usual course of professional practice that was established by U.S. v. Moore.50 Some circuits 
believe that this statement includes without a legitimate medical purpose as utilized in cases in 
line with U.S. v. Tighe.51  On the other hand, some circuits interpret the standard to mean outside 
the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose as seen 
within U.S. v. Feingold.52 To begin, for a person to be convicted under The CSA, they must 
knowingly or intentionally: (1) manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with the intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) create, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.53 The “standards” that the 
caselaw interprets can be seen within the notes of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841.54 Ultimately, the 
interpretations that stem from these case can be reduced to whether the physician should be 
subjected to increased protections. The following paragraphs will examine Moore and the 
standard it sets forth. 
 U.S. v. Moore, involves the prosecution and conviction of a physician under §841 of The 
CSA.55 The physician was caught unlawfully distributing and dispensing methadone.56 
Methadone is an extremely addictive substance that is typically used to treat heroin addicts due 
to the similar “euphoric highs” that one gets from heroin.57 The use of methadone requires proper 
supervision and control to be effective and not harmful.58 The two most common methods to 
treating heroin addicts with methadone is through a maintenance method, which requires 
 
50 United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975) 
51 United States v. Tighe, 551 F.2d 18 (3rd Cir. 1977) 
52 United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006) 
53 21 U.S.C.S. § 841 
54 Id 
55 U.S. v. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124 
56 Id 
57 Id at 125 
58 Id 
10 
 
authorization from Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and a detoxification method.59 The 
concept under maintenance is to give a heroin addict a fixed amount of methadone for an 
indefinite amount of time to keep the urge of using heroin minimal.60 Under a detoxification 
method, an addict is given a large amount of methadone during the beginning of the treatment to 
minimize withdrawl symptoms and will tapper off as time goes on.61 Dr. Moore previously had 
authorization from the FDA revoked but that did not stop him.62 Between September 1971 and 
mid-February 1972, three pharmacies within the District of Columbia area filled 11,169 
prescriptions that were written by Dr. Moore.63 Roughly 800,000 methadone pills were 
prescribed during this time.64 Additionally, during a fifty-four-day period, Dr. Moore filled over 
100 prescriptions a day while making over $260,000 during the five and a half months.65 Dr. 
Moore was paid via a “sliding-scale” that ranged from $15 for a fifty-pill prescription to $50 for 
a 150 pill prescription.66 The defendant conceded that he did not observe the generally accepted 
medical practices.67 It was clear to the Court that the defendant acted outside the usual course of 
professional practice. The Court stated that Dr. Moore was acting as a “pusher” instead of a 
physician.68 The Court found that Dr. Moore gave inadequate examinations to patients if they got 
one at all.69 He ignored or did comply with test results he conducted.70 He had no precautions to 
prevent misuse of methadone by the patients.71 He did not restrict the dosage patients received 
 
59 Id at 126 
60 Id 
61 Id 
62 Id 
63 Id at 127 
64 Id 
65 Id 
66 Id at 128 
67 Id at 135 
68 Id at 137 
69 Id  
70 Id 
71 Id at 140 
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and frequently prescribed the amount the patient requested.72 As previously stated, he adjusted 
his fees based on the number of pills he prescribed to his patients.73 The Court found that the 
legislative history of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841 indicated that the concern of Congress was the nature of 
the drug transaction and not the title of the person who is conducting the transaction.74   
 U.S. v. Moore is the bedrock case involving prosecutions of physicians under 21 U.S.C. § 
841 for the prescribing of opioids that was first addressed by the Supreme Court. Since then, the 
Supreme Court has not further discussed 21 U.S.C. § 841 and Moore. U.S. v. Moore provided the 
standard that has been used by Circuit Courts since then, including two years later when the 
Third Circuit considered U.S. v. Tighe. 
 In Tighe, the defendant, Dr. Patrick Tighe, was a licensed physician within 
Pennsylvania.75 Between November 26, 1973 and May 29, 1974, two DEA agents visited Dr. 
Tighe at his office and at his home.76 During these visits by the DEA agents, eighteen unfilled 
prescriptions for biphetamines were found in his office, presumably to be given to someone who 
desires copious amounts of drugs.77 The facts of the case do not specify the reason as to why Dr. 
Patrick Tighe had unfilled prescriptions for biphetamines laying around his home and office, but 
it is believed that he was dispensing biphetamines outside his practice.78 Nevertheless, Dr. 
Patrick Tighe was convicted under The CSA, because he acted outside the usual course of 
professional practice.79 Tighe takes the Moore approach by including without a legitimate 
 
72 Id at 125 
73 Id 
74 Id at 130 
75 United States v. Tighe, 551 F.2d at 19 
76 Id 
77 Id 
78 Id at 20 
79 Id  
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medical purpose within using outside the usual course of professional practice.80 It was clear 
that there was no legitimate medical purpose to have eighteen unfilled prescriptions for 
biphetamines within your office. The Third Circuit in this case took the position that there is no 
other requirement to 21 U.S.C.S. § 841 besides what is stated within the statute. It is plain to see 
that having multiple unfilled prescriptions of a schedule II drug is outside the usual course of 
professional practice.  
 United States v. Rottschaefer, continued this idea that outside the usual course of 
professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose are the same81. Dr. Rottschaefer 
was convicted under The CSA for unlawful distribution of controlled substances.82 At trial, his 
patients testified that Dr. Rottschaefer prescribed them Xanax, Oxycontin and other addictive 
painkillers to feed their prescription drug addictions.83 Additionally, four out of five testifying 
patients stated that they had to perform sexual favors as payment for their prescription.84 Dr. 
Rottschaefer argued that he was improperly convicted under a medical malpractice or negligence 
standard rather than the higher burden The CSA requires.85 Throughout the trial, the prosecutor 
used without a legitimate medical purpose instead of using outside the usual course of 
professional practice.86 The Third Circuit examined whether the use of without a legitimate 
medical purpose was proper.87 Based on the text from The CSA, the Third Circuit held that 
physicians will be held criminally liable if they prescribe and dispense prescription drugs outside 
the usual course of professional practice.88  Furthermore, the physician must prescribe the drug 
 
80 Id 
81 United States v. Rottschaefer, 178 Fed. Appx. 145 (3rd Cir. 2006) 
82 Id at 146 
83 Id 
84 Id at 149 
85 United States v. Rottschaefer, 178 Fed. Appx. at 150 
86 Id 
87 Id 
88 Id at 149 
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with legitimate medical purpose by the physician acting within the usual course of professional 
practice28. If the prescription drug is knowingly given for ineffective reasons/purposes, the 
physician is subjected to the penalties of law.28 Therefore, the court determined that The CSA 
can use legitimate medical purpose when prosecuting a defendant28. The Third Circuit further 
stated that the prosecutor using without a legitimate medical purpose was not a medical 
malpractice or a negligence standard that Dr. Rottschaefer argues.89  Next, the court examined 
whether there is a distinction between outside the usual course of professional practice and 
without a legitimate medical purpose. Using the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, the Third 
Circuit agreed that there is no difference between the two.90 The Third Circuit ultimately agrees 
with the Fifth and Fourth Circuit holdings that the if there was a distinction, it is of no 
importance within the context of The CSA.91  
 In United States v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit used similar reasoning as seen in United 
States v. Rottschaefer by claiming that outside the usual course of professional practice includes 
without a legitimate medical purpose to inform and meet the criteria of The CSA.92 Smith, did 
not involve a physician, but a businessman that was convicted of selling millions of dollars’ 
worth of prescription drugs online without valid prescriptions.93 Nevertheless, The CSA still 
applies, because it is not limited to the profession of the individual that dispenses, distributes or 
prescribes prescription drugs.94 Smith started distributing and selling prescription drugs online in 
2004.95 Smith’s website had several names over the period it operated but the one thing that 
remained constant was the questionnaire that Smith required all customers to fill out prior to 
 
89 Id at 148 
90 Id at 147 
91 Id at 150 
92 United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009) 
93 Id at 640 
94 21 U.S.C.S. § 841 
95 United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d at 640 
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purchasing the prescription drugs.96 The questionnaire only required the customer to submit 
information regarding their name, address, date of birth, phone number, height, and weight; 
however, there was a spot for the customer to write in their medical condition/reason for the need 
of prescription.97 After some time of being open, Smith hired Dr. Phillip Mach to help issue 
prescriptions.98 Dr. Mach would review the submissions from the customers and either approve 
or deny the request for prescription drugs.99 Yet, if Dr. Mach denied a request, Smith would have 
that submission reviewed again by another employee, who would ultimately approve the request, 
because Smith’s company was under a “sell sell sell” mentality.100 Furthermore, in case the 
customer did not have internet access, Smith also established call centers within the United 
States for customers to call to purchase prescription drugs over the phone.101 Despite the allege 
requirement of needing necessary information to fill the prescription, Smith and Dr. Mach filled 
most requests get approved regardless of amount of adequate information given or whether the 
injury requires prescription drugs.102 In fact, the FDA found that most requests did not provide 
enough information for a physician to adequately decide whether the patient required 
prescription drugs.103 During the investigation into the business, undercover FDA agents made 
six requests for prescription drugs with false information through defendants and none of the 
requests were verified by the defendants regarding the accuracy of their information.104 
Throughout the year that the website was open, Dr. Mach approved about 72,000 orders per day 
 
96 Id at 641 
97 Id 
98 Id 
99 Id at 642 
100 Id at 644 
101 Id at 643 
102 United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d at 644 
103 Id 
104 Id 
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for pharmaceutical companies while the total amount sold was worth about $24 million.105 
Smith’s business model preyed upon smaller pharmacies that were economically dependent on 
Smith’s company.106 To soothe the concerns these pharmacies had, Smith stated within their 
contracts that their business model was FDA approved.107 Smith and Dr. Mach’s highest selling 
drug was hydrocodone, which they sold over four-million tablets.108 In May 2005, a preliminary 
injunction was filed against Smith and his business.109 In response, Smith fled the United States 
to Dominican Republic where he was arrested when he returned to the US some time later.110 On 
November 22, 2006, a jury found Smith guilty on various accounts, one being The CSA.111 
Smith argues that the court used a medical malpractice standard and not The CSA standard.112  
 The 8th Circuit disagreed with Smith on both points, because the jury instruction 
conforms with Moore.113 To start, within the usual course of professional practice is not a 
medical malpractice standard but the proper standard for The CSA, because, according to the 8th 
Circuit, it conforms with Moore.114 The 8th Circuit relies on the fact that Moore considers within 
the usual course of professional practice to incorporate without a legitimate medical purpose.115 
Similar to Moore, the 8th Circuit finds it hard to imagine a scenario where a physician is acting 
within the usual course of professional practice while acting without a legitimate medical 
purpose.116 Therefore, the 8th Circuit finds that the district court was correct in interpreting the 
 
105 Id 
106 Id at 645 
107 Id 
108 Id 
109 Id 
110 Id at 646 
111 Id 
112 Id 
113 Id at 646 
114 Id at 659 
115 Id  
116 Id 
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standard to be within the usual course of professional practice of The CSA.117 Regarding Dr. 
Mach’s conduct, the 8th Circuit stated that the totality of the acts taken by Dr. Mach succeeds on 
this element.118 For instance, Dr. Mach approved of many requests that lack enough information 
to indicate whether that patient required prescription drugs or not.119 In other words, Dr. Mach 
was prescribing without legitimate medical purpose when he routinely prescribed prescription 
drugs to patients that did not provide adequate medical information or included injuries that did 
not require prescription drug usage for recovery and treatment.120 It is possible that if Dr. Mach 
verified the information he received or requested more that the 8th Circuit would have allowed 
Dr. Mach to meet this element of The CSA, but that seems unlikely due to the fact that Dr. Mach 
was prescribing about 72,000 orders a day. All in all, the 8th Circuit claims that considering 
outside the usual course of professional practice and without legitimate medical purpose to be 
one-in-the-same, because the difficulty to have one without the other.121 This is not different 
from the 3rd Circuit, because the 8th Circuit believe that the two are the same. One cannot exist 
without the other, therefore, the 8th Circuit believes that the test includes both, not separate them.  
 The last case involving circuit courts considering without legitimate medical purpose to 
be within outside the usual course of professional practice is U.S. v. Armstrong.122 Armstrong 
was a registered nurse who owned and operated some clinics and pharmacies.123 In the 
beginning, her clinics and pharmacies focused primarily on weight loss from 1998-2000.124 
During this time, her clinics and pharmacies did prescribe controlled substances for the 
 
117 Id 
118 Id at 660 
119 Id 
120 Id 
121 Id at 659 
122 United States v. Armstrong, 550 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2008) 
123 Id at 386 
124 Id 
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management and loss of weight.125 However, in or around August 2000, Armstrong switched the 
primary focus towards pain management.126 At this point, the clinics and pharmacies started 
prescribing off-brand versions of the “trinity drugs.”127 The drugs that make up the “trinity 
drugs” are hydrocodone, alprazolam/diazepam, and carisoprodol.128 Regardless of whether the 
actual “trinity drugs” are stocked and sold or if the pharmacy stocks and sells generic versions, 
they are highly addictive.129 In April 2005, agents of the DEA shut down Armstrong’s clinics 
and pharmacies for conspiring to dispense controlled substances in violation of The CSA.130 The 
DEA also found that the following defendants were involved in knowingly and intentionally 
dispensing controlled substances.131 The facts of the case do not specifically mention what the 
conduct of the defendants were, nevertheless, they were convicted for conspiracy under The 
CSA.132  
 The defendants in this case challenged the jury instruction, because it only had outside 
the usual course of professional practice.133 The 5th Circuit found that the jury instruction was 
grounded in previous instructions and cases (see Moore).134 This court stated that outside the 
usual course of professional practice was intended to include without legitimate medical purpose 
and agreed with the district court that behavioral examples of one can meet the other.135 Similar 
to how other courts consider the two, the 5th Circuit considers the two to be one in the same. The 
5th Circuit believes and agrees without circuits (such as the 3rd and the 8th) that a logical reading 
 
125 Id 
126 Id 
127 Id 
128 Id 
129 Id 
130 Id 
131 Id at 387 
132 Id 
133 Id at 395 
134 Id 
135 Id 
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of Moore indicates that both are the same rather than separate elements of The CSA.136 Once 
again, circuit courts are interpreting The CSA to have only three elements.137 
 The circuits that were previously discussed take the approach that to be convicted under 
The CSA, a person must dispense, distribute, or prescribe controlled substance either outside the 
usual course of professional practice or without legitimate medical purpose. All the circuit 
courts rely on a belief that there are no scenarios where a physician/person could act with 
legitimate medical purpose but outside the usual course of professional practice or vice versa. In 
other words, these circuits believe that if you meet one, you meet the other, or if you fail one, 
you fail the other. Whether this is the case will be discussed later in the paper. The subsequent 
paragraphs will illustrate the circuit court cases that have the other interpretation of The CSA. 
 Moving onto the interpretation, circuit courts that align themselves within this camp 
typically believe that The CSA requires something a bit more than outside the usual course of 
professional practice. Some circuit courts consider without legitimate medical purposes to be a 
“4th element” within The CSA.138  
 U.S. v. Tran Trong Cuong involves a physician that practiced in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia who was registered with the DEA and properly authorized to prescribe controlled 
substances under The CSA.139 Between April 1989 and January 1992, Dr. Tran prescribed 
approximately 1,711 controlled substances, such as Percodan, Vicodin, Valium and Zanax, to 
thirty patients.140 Around 1990, a pharmacist and an inspector from the Virginia Department of 
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Health, were concerned about the amount and manner that Dr. Tran was prescribing.141 For 
instance, the pharmacist informed Dr. Tran that one of his patients was receiving prescription 
drugs from other physicians while Jennings, the inspector, contacted Dr. Tran to warn him that 
he was being “conned” into prescribing drugs that were known drug abusers.142 The government 
had several former patients testify that they reported fake symptoms to Dr. Tran to receive 
prescription drugs.143 Additionally, some asked for specific drugs from Dr. Tran.144 In response, 
Dr. Tran frequently reminded his patients that he could not prescribe them drugs without the 
patients informing him that they were in pain.145 To help them, Dr. Tran also advised the patients 
to fill their prescriptions at multiple pharmacies.146 On one occasion, Dr. Tran accepted office 
repair work from a patient in return for prescription drugs.147 At one point, the DEA obtained a 
search warrant to investigate Dr. Tran’s office.148 The DEA found records indicating that Dr. 
Tran charged patients $35 for non-refillable prescriptions.149 Furthermore, the DEA obtained 
testimony from Dr. Tran’s patients stating that Dr. Tran would advise and suggest that the patient 
needed to have different complaints of pain, such as location and severity, to avoid suspicion of 
prolonged pain.150 Sometime during 1991, the DEA sent two undercover agents to Dr. Tran’s 
office where the agents asked to see Dr. Tran when they did not have appointments to seek 
prescription drugs.151 Dr. Tan saw one of the two undercover agents eight times over two months 
during the early part of 1991, and on each visit, Dr. Tan saw the undercover agent for less than 
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five minutes and prescribed prescription drugs on each visit.152 The agents testified that Dr. Tran 
never performed any medical evaluations on them; additionally, one of the agents testified that 
he/she advised Dr. Tran that he/she would like to “feel a little mellowed out.”153 The other 
officer, dressed very shabbily and with bourbon whiskey spilt all over his clothes, testified that 
he asked Dr. Tran for Percodan to get through winter as a construction laborer.154 However, Dr. 
Tran refused to prescribe the undercover agent Percodan, but agreed to prescribe Vicodin.155  
 The 4th Circuit reversed and remanded the case on some counts for issues regarding the 
manner of witness testimony, however, for the purpose of this paper, we are examining the 
standard used within the jury instruction.156 Dr. Tran contended that the district court used a 
medical malpractice standard rather than the criminal standard set forth in Moore.157 The 
defendant’s claim relies on the court advising witnesses that the “standard is whether a 
reasonably prudent physician would do it,” and “whether it is within the standard of care of a 
family practitioner,” and “whether in the usual course of treating a patient by the average family 
practitioner.”158 The 4th Circuit agreed that the statements from the district court reflected a 
negligence standard and not a criminal standard, but found that the instruction given to the jury 
contained the sufficient burden threshold.159 The jury instruction contained the following:  
The third element, no legitimate medical purpose. The final element the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant prescribed 
the drug other than for legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual course of 
medical practice.160 
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The 4th Circuit found that this instruction was satisfactory based on the definitions within The 
CSA.161 In addition, the 4th Circuit stated that without legitimate medical purpose was stricter 
than what was intended by Moore and was therefore beneficial to Dr. Tran.162 The “stricter 
standard” used by the district court was not explicitly utilized to benefit the defendant but did on 
some counts.163 For example, 80 counts (1-8, 25-64, 69-84, 93-96, 101-112) did not meet the 
threshold of the third element within The CSA.164 Some counts involved the government’s claim 
that patients requesting specific drugs by name are “red flags” to a doctor, therefore, the doctor 
acted outside the usual course of professional practice.165 The 4th Circuit agrees that this does 
inform the jury of the possibility of Dr. Tran acting inappropriately, but it is not sufficient to 
meet the criminal standard set forth by The CSA.166 The 4th Circuit found that prescribing 
prescription drugs to patients that requested said drug by name does not, by itself, reach the 
standard of acting outside the usual course of professional practice and without legitimate 
medical purpose.167 The Tran case does not endorse that view that courts need to enact a stricter 
standard than what Moore intended, but it does lay the foundation for rationale that other courts 
use to support a “stricter standard.” The next cases illustrate how the Moore standard changed to 
require additional material. 
 The one case that benchmarks the approach of additional material for The CSA is United 
States v. Feingold.168 Dr. Jeffery Feingold was a naturopathic physician licensed by Arizona that 
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was convicted of illegally distributing controlled substance in violation of The CSA.169 Dr. 
Feingold moved to Arizona and opened his own practice in 1990.170 Arizona granted all 
naturopathic physicians the authority and ability to prescribe Schedule II, III, IV, and V 
controlled substances in 2000.171 However, in 2002, Arizona revised this and revoked their 
ability to prescribe Schedule II, outside morphine.172 During this time, Dr. Feingold obtained the 
proper licensing and authority from the DEA to prescribe controlled substances.173 At trial, the 
government called many former patients to testify against Dr. Feingold regarding his behavior 
and actions of prescribing controlled substances.174 For instance, some patients testified that they 
received controlled substances from Dr. Feingold despite never seeing him, being physically 
examined or recording reasons for the prescription.175 Other patients testified that Dr. Feingold 
prescribed them controlled substances notwithstanding the fact that he knew they were drug 
addicts.176 Further, one patient testified Dr. Feingold prescribed him controlled substance in 
exchange for having painted Dr. Feingold’s house.177 Additionally, Dr. Feingold continued 
prescribing Schedule II controlled substances in spite of Arizona revoking that authority.178 
Lastly, the DEA sent two undercover agents to obtain prescriptions from Dr. Feingold and the 
undercover agents were able to obtain the prescriptions in a manner that was identical to how his 
former patients testified.179 
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 Dr. Feingold challenged the jury instruction claiming it did not reach the criminal 
standard set forth by Moore, but rather indicated the threshold was incompetency.180 The 9th 
Circuit disagreed with Dr. Feingold but did remand for resentencing.181 Throughout the trial, Dr. 
Feingold conceded that his conduct regarding the complaint was outside the usual course of 
professional practice, but Dr. Feingold contested that he was acting with legitimate medical 
purpose, because his patients were in pain.182 In other words, Dr. Feingold argued that the jury 
instruction lacked a mens rea or intent component that The CSA contains.183 The 9th Circuit 
agrees with Dr. Feingold’s arguments, because a physician acting with good faith for a legitimate 
medical purpose is generally a defense against a criminal conviction under The CSA.184 The 9th 
Circuit interprets Moore and The CSA to allow doctors to refute the claims against them if they 
can show they acted within the usual course of professional practice or acted in good faith for a 
legitimate medical purpose.185 Furthermore, the 9th Circuit interprets Moore to impose a much 
higher burden for criminal convictions compared to medical malpractice/negligence.186 To 
summarize, to convict a physician under The CSA, the physician must cease to be a physician 
and simply not be negligent.187 Now, taking Dr. Feingold’s case, the 9th Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s conviction, because the record did not contain any information that Dr. Feingold 
acted in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose.188 Rather, the record reflected that Dr. 
Feingold’s argument to refute The CSA claim was that he was simply incompetent and honestly 
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wanted to help his patients despite being unfamiliar with controlled substances.189 Additionally, 
Dr. Feingold asserted that he did not know that his patients were abusing the prescriptions due to 
his lack of training, and that he never intended to “flout” professional protocol.190 Therefore, 
based on the record, the 9th Circuit concluded that any reasonable jury could find that Dr. 
Feingold violated The CSA by intentionally acting outside the usual course of professional 
practice.191 The 9th Circuit here diverts from other circuits by setting up another component in 
The CSA claims by allowing physicians to shield themselves by proving they were acting in 
good faith for a legitimate medical purpose. This was not seen in the circuits that consider 
legitimate medical purpose to be included within outside the usual course of professional 
practice.  
 The last case that will be discussed in the paper is United States v. Wexler.192 On March 
17, 2006, Dr. Wexler, a dermatologist in Manhattan, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute, 
and possession with intent to distribute Dilaudid, Percocet, Vicodin and Xanax, in violation of 
The CSA.193 The evidence presented at trial suggested that Wexler prescribed the listed 
controlled substances, as painkillers, to addicted patients.194 One such patient was Barry Alber, 
who resold said prescriptions to other addicts and later died of an overdose.195 Additionally, 
Wexler caused two others to become addicted to painkillers by prescribing controlled substances 
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without evaluating them.196 An expert witness testified for the government indicating that the 
records kept by Dr. Wexler were so incomplete that they were not medical charts at all.197 
 Dr. Wexler challenged the jury instruction, because it lacked the phrase “good 
intentions,” but only had “good faith.”198 Since the district did not include “good intentions,” Dr. 
Wexler contends that the standard resembled a gross mistake or malpractice standard instead of 
the criminal standard.199 The 2nd Circuit disagrees with Dr. Wexler, because they consider “good 
intentions” to be part of “good faith.” Therefore, the district court did not err in omitting Dr. 
Wexler’s request.200 Dr. Wexler raised that challenge, because he felt that the jury instruction 
misleads the jury in considering his “good faith” defense of prescribing the painkillers for a 
legitimate medical purpose.201 The 2nd Circuit agrees with Dr. Wexler that he deserves a chance 
to refute the government’s claim by providing a defense, but the court disagrees that the specific 
wording of the jury instruction is critical within the context of The CSA compared to other 
laws.202 In fact, the 2nd Circuit cites Feingold to justify the use of good faith with a legitimate 
medical purpose defense.203 Furthermore, the 2nd Circuit cites Moore to illustrate that the 
purpose of The CSA is to punish physicians that do not act like physicians but act as a 
“pusher.”204  
 In conclusion, there appears to be two approaches to interpreting and utilizing The CSA. 
On one hand, some courts look at the evidence and determine whether the person was acting 
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outside the usual course of professional practice. On the other hand, some courts look at the 
evidence and determine whether the person was outside the usual course of professional practice 
and without a legitimate medical purpose. The former group considers without a legitimate 
medical purpose to be incorporated within outside the usual course of professional practice. The 
latter group believes that good faith plays a larger role within The CSA claims. A good faith 
defense involves whether the physician had a legitimate medical purpose for providing the 
treatment he/she decided to conduct. The following section of the paper will analyze the cases 
and examine whether there are different standards. Additionally, if there are multiple standards, 
how they impact physicians and prescribers.  
 
Analysis: 
 The following section will examine the impact of the standards on physicians and the 
potential implications of having multiple standards for The CSA. Afterwards, the section will 
discuss how state laws coincide with federal law.  
 According to the cases, there is a circuit split regarding the mens rea component of The 
CSA. Some courts prefer to provide more protections for physicians through adding a good faith 
element and/or by separating without a legitimate medical purpose from outside the usual course 
of professional practice. The importance of this split involves how the jury will utilize these 
varying instructions. The circuit courts do not believe the distinction is of any importance, 
because the courts find it difficult to imagine a situation where a physician was acting outside the 
usual course of professional practice but had a legitimate medical purpose. However, juries 
could imagine a situation, because they are, generally, more sympathetic towards defendants and 
plaintiffs. For instance, a physician that works hard as a solo-practitioner provides extra 
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prescriptions for his/her patients that are physically unable to make appointments to renew their 
prescriptions. This act would be outside the usual course of professional practice, but a skillful 
attorney could convince a jury that there is good faith and the physician acted with legitimate 
medical purpose. Practically speaking, the added defense for a physician can be the difference 
between being convicted and being acquitted.  
 The caselaw would beg to differ on that point, but the facts of those cases do not shed are 
not defendant friendly. Going back to the example brought up above, two physicians that do the 
exact same thing could, in theory, have different outcomes. One would be convicted under The 
CSA, because he/she was acting outside the usual course of professional practice. However, the 
other physician would not be convicted because he/she had a legitimate medical purpose. This 
does not seem to be the national standard that Moore indicated was needed for The CSA. Laws 
are supposed to be predictable, so people know how to act to avoid being sued and/or going to 
jail. The CSA is one of the most important law for a physician to abide by.  
 In addition to The CSA, physicians must follow state laws and regulations to remained 
licensed within their state. As we have seen, some states, like New Jersey, are strict while others, 
like Oregon, are lenient with their laws and regulations. The stricter states prefer to control the 
physicians rather than the lenient states. For example, strict states require physicians to only 
prescribe a few days’ worth of opioids. On the other hand, lenient states allow physicians to use 
their judgment to determine the amount. Regardless of the state the physician is licensed in, said 
physician must comply with both state laws and regulations along with the federal law. There 
can be scenarios in which a physician can be compliant in one state, but potential violate The 
CSA. For instance, the physician lives in Oregon and prescribes a month’s worth of opioids for a 
patient, because the patient is traveling for the next month and requires the prescription to 
function, additionally, assume that the patient is taking the prescription and not doing anything 
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nefarious with the prescription. In Oregon, this would be within the bounds of the physician. 
Obviously, this is not within the bounds of New Jersey or New York. Nevertheless, this could 
violate The CSA depending on which circuit the physician was in. On one hand, this is clearly 
outside the usual course of professional practice, but one can argue that the physician was acting 
with a legitimate medical purpose.  
 
Conclusion: 
 There are two instructions that are given to juries for a case involving The CSA. One 
instruction provides more affordance for a physician while the other does not. There are 
scenarios that illustrate that division between the instructions. Conforming states to have similar 
laws would be extremely difficult for multiple reasons, such as state sovereignty. Therefore, the 
focus should be on setting a national standard for The CSA. This would prevent certain groups of 
physicians from being convicted while others are not. Ultimately, The CSA was designed to 
prevent physicians from pushing drugs and to protect patients from opioid addictions.  
